

2 September 1975

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STRATEGY REPORT FOR KIQ #4

KIQ #4: In the Sino-Soviet relationship, what are the capabilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides -- conflict, confrontation, accommodation, or continued uneasy stalemate?

Amplification:

How do the Soviets and the Chinese each now view their triangular relationship with the US? How does each perceive the leverage to be distributed, and on what issues? What elements in the Chinese leadership might prefer a more balanced relationship with the US and the USSR?

How will the US withdrawal from Indochina affect Sino-Soviet competition in these areas? How, particularly, will the USSR and China each perceive its various equities and opportunities in Korea and in Japan?

What sources and mechanisms does each side have to view, evaluate and influence the other?

What views of the other party are held by key individuals and groups in the Chinese and Soviet leaderships?

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How confident are the Soviets in their knowledge of the precise locations of Chinese missile sites and how confident is each party of its information on the pace of the other's weapons development?

Collection Strategy:

The community will collect, primarily through satellite photography and secondarily through COMINT, information on changes in the Sino-Soviet military balance. Information on the intentions and expectations of the two sides will come chiefly from human sources

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Analysis Strategy:

Develop weighted lists of indicators that would signal significant improvement or worsening of Sino-Soviet relations. This would be intended to marshal all the evidence for our readers and, more important, to establish baselines from which to measure any future changes.

CIA/OPR will produce a paper defining likely limitations to any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations under various sets of circumstances.

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\*Note: This is last year's text. Any suggestions?

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